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CHAPTER 16 
State and Local Taxation 
GEORGE T. SHAW 
§16.1. Introduction. The 1970 SURVEY year was not a year of dy-
namic decision-making or legislative activity in the field of state and 
local taxation. It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss and critically 
analyze those judicial decisions and legislative enactments· of greatest 
consequence to the Massachusetts practitioner and his taxpaying client, 
personal or corporate. 
State and local taxation has beconie a political issue and, as a result, 
significant developments can be expected in future yean.. It can be pre-
dicted with confidence that there will be a serious dem:ind for reform 
of the entire state and local taxing structure to relieve the tax burden 
which, at the state and, more importantly, at the local level, falls 
primarily on those taxpayers who are least able to sustain it. The in-
flationary spiral, coupled with the ever-increasing demand for munic-
ipal and state services, will require a serious reappraisal of the present 
method of raising revenue. It is hoped that the report of the Master 
Tax Commission, created by the legislature in 19671 and headed by 
Senator George v. Kenneally of Quincy, will provide some constructive 
and carefully considered recommendations which will lead to the 
much-needed revision of the General Laws dealing with this subject. 
This report is scheduled to be submitted shortly after the close of the 
1970 SuRVEY year, but it will probably be at least two years before any 
recommendations made by the commission can be enacted into law. 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§16.2. Property taxes: Governmental immunity. Massachusetts 
exempts from local property taxes property owned by the United States 
"so far as the taxation of such property is constitutionally prohibited."! 
This exemption can thus expand and contract as the United States 
Constitution is from time to time interpreted. This year the Supreme 
Judicial Court, following the lead of recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions, contracted the exemption to an extent not theretofore 
required by Massachusetts decisions. 
In Board of Assessors of Wilmington v. Avco Corp.,2 Avco, the lessee 
GEORGE T. SHAW is associated with the firm of Hemenway and Barnes, Boston. 
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of certain real estate in Wilmington, erected on the leased premises 
three towers for use in carrying out the project being conducted pur-
suant to a contract with the Air Force. The contract provided that 
title to the towers vested in the United States and that Avco would be 
reimbursed by the Air Force for out-of-pocket expenses for rent and real 
estate taxes. Avco's lease required it to pay as additional rent the real 
estate taxes on the premises. The principal issue before the Court was 
whether the assessment of taxes on account of the towers was valid 
under the statutory exemption and, by reference, the Constitution. The 
Court, relying on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, re-
versed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board and held that the tax 
was properly assessed because it was not "constitutionally prohibited." 
The question of the validity of local or state property and sales taxes 
assessed on government contractors working on a "cost-plus" basis has 
reached the United States Supreme Court on several occasions. In its 
recent cases, the Supreme Court has generally upheld the tax when the 
assessed property was used by the contractor in connection with its own 
commercial activities, notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate eco-
nomic burden fell upon the United States because of the cost reim-
bursement provisions of project contracts. Two cases are particularly 
noteworthy because of the factual similarity with the instant case. 
In United States v. Allegheny County,3 a war material manufacturer 
was assessed a local property tax on account of machinery in its plant 
owned by the United States and leased to the manufacturer for a 
nominal consideration. The United States agreed with the manufac-
turer to pay taxes attributable to the machinery. The Supreme Court 
held that the "Government-owned property, to the full extent of the 
Government's interest therein, is immune from taxation, either as 
against the Government itself or as against one who holds it as a 
bailee."4 
During the next decade and a half, Allegheny County was signif-
icantly diluted and its holding restricted to ·its particular facts. In 
1953, the Supreme Court held in Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Evans5 that a 
tax, denominated a "privilege tax" by the state, for storing government 
oil in Esso's tanks under a government contract which shifted the 
economic burden of the tax to the Government was valid even though 
the tax was measured by the quantity of oil stored. The Court distin-
guished Esso from Allegheny County on the ground that, in the latter, 
the tax was on the property while, in the former, Esso's privilege of 
storing that property was the object of the tax. 
Detroit v. Murray Corp. of America6 involved a tax levied against 
Murray, a cost-plus government contractor, with respect to government-
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1025, 260 N.E.2d 179. 
3 322 u.s. 174 (1944). 
4 ld. at 189. 
5 345 u.s. 495 (1958). 
6 355 u.s. 489 (1958). 
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owned property held by Murray as a bailee for completion of its sub-
contract. The value of the government property was included in the 
assessment of the tax. The tax in question clearly seemed to be an ad 
valorem property tax assessed on government property. A tax so applied 
was proscribed in Allegheny County, and the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held the earlier case and Murray indistinguishahle.7 A sharply 
divided Supreme Court disagreed and distinguished Allegheny County: 
in that case, the tax was a property tax; in the case before the Court, 
the tax in essence was a tax upon the privilege of using personal 
property. The dissenting opinions of Justices Whittaker and Frank-
furter show, convincingly to this writer, that the tax in Murray was as 
much a property tax as that in Allegheny County. Two other cases8 
decided the same day as Murray (and, with Murray, forming the so-
called Michigan Trilogy) also demonstrate how narrow - if it exists 
at all -is the tax immunity of government contractors with respect 
to government-owned property used in connection with private com-
mercial activities. 
This writer believes Murray was incorrectly decided. Had Murray 
held the tax then in question invalid, the tax in Avco pmbably would 
have been invalid as well. However, given the decisions in the Michigan 
Trilogy and the sub silentio overruling of Allegheny County, the deci-
sion of the Supreme Judicial Court in Avco was correct. The Court, 
as required by the exemption statute, permitted the tax to reach to the 
edge of constitutional proscription. 
§16.3. Property taxes: Exemption for the elderly. In Board of 
Assessors of Cambridge v. Bellissimo,l the Supreme Judkial Court was 
called upon to construe the exemption from real property taxes granted 
to certain elderly persons.2 In Bellissimo, the taxpayers, husband and 
wife, had owned certain real estate in Cambridge as joint tenants for 
over forty years. On February 13, 1964, they conveyed the property, 
through their son as a straw, to themselves as trustees and life bene-
ficiaries, reserving the power to sell, lease or mortgage the premises 
during their lives or the life of the survivor. The trust was to terminate 
on the death of the survivor and the property was then to be divided 
equally among the taxpayers' children. One of the conditions to the 
granting of this exemption is that the person to whom the tax is as-
sessed must have owned the property "either individually, jointly, or as 
a tenant in common, for the preceding five years."a The assessors 
claimed that the conveyance from the taxpayers to the straw and con-
currently from the straw to the taxpayers as trustees interrupted the 
continuous five-year ownership requirement and made the exemption 
7 234 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1956). 
8 United States v. Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States "· Muskegon, 355 
u.s. 484 (1958). 
§16.3. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 439, 257 N.E.2d 463. 
2 G.L., c. 59, §5, cl. 41. 
3 Ibid. 
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unavailable. The Court held that the exemption was not destroyed by 
that transfer because the taxpayers occupied the property as their 
residence without interruptioiJ. and because the conveyance through a 
straw altered the form but not the substance of the ownership. 
The decision of the Court is generally consistent with its earlier 
cases and allows the purpose of the exemption (mitigating the financial 
hardships of elderly taxpayers)4 to be carried forward and, at the same 
time, gives elderly taxpayers a certain flexibility in their estate plan-
ning. 
In Coroa v. Board of Assessors of Fall River,5 the taxpayer, the sur-
viving joint tenant of certain real estate, conveyed the property to 
herself and her two children as joint tenants in April, 1962. In Decem-
ber of 1965, they conveyed the property to the taxpayer for life, with 
a remainder to the two children. The taxpayer was held entitled to the 
exemption for the tax assessed on January 1, 1966, notwithstanding 
the two conveyances during the preceding five years. In Coady v. Board 
of Assessors of Fall River,6 the facts were essentially the same, except 
that the conveyance creating a life estate from the taxpayer was made 
through a straw rather than directly, as was done in Coroa. The Court 
in Coady held the exemption was available to the taxpayer and that 
the conveyance through a straw did not interrupt the five-year con-
tinuous ownership requirement which dearly was otherwise present. 
In the principal case, the Court had to distinguish the earlier case 
of Kirby v. Board of Assessors of Medford7 in which the owner of 
certain real estate, who otherwise qualified for the exemption, con-
veyed the real estate to a trustee, reserving the power to revoke and 
amend the trust. The tax was assessed against the trustee as record 
owner, and the question presented was whether the exemption was 
available, because the beneficial owner essentially had outright owner-
ship of the property by virtue of his power to amend or revoke the 
trust. The Court in Kirby held that the exemption was available on 
those facts only to a person who was the record owner of real estate. 
In all of these cases there runs a common thread of attempts by 
elderly persons to make various provisions for the management of 
their real estate, either by reserving life estates or creating trusts. In 
each case, the elderly person, for all practical purposes, was the owner 
of the real estate and had been the owner for the required five years. 
All that had been altered was the form of ownership. The purpose of 
the statute is satisfied if the exemption is made available whenever an 
elderly person can be considered to be the owner of the real property 
upon examination of the substance and not the form of the ownership. 
The exemption should be interpreted to permit flexibility in estate 
planning for elderly persons without destroying the exemption, as long 
4 Board of Assessors of Everett v. Formosi, 349 Mass. 727, 212 N.E.2d 210 (1965). 
5 354 Mass. 235, 236 N.E.2d 875 (1968). 
6 354 Mass. 237, 236 N.E.2d 877 (1968). 
7 350 Mass. 386, 215 N.E.2d 99 (1966). 
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as, in substance, the elderly person remains the owner oJ: the property. 
Following this policy, the principal case was correctly decided. The 
Kirby case, however, is inconsistent with the other case:> for in Kirby 
the form of transaction was allowed to control the substance. 
§16.4. State-owned property: Distributions to cities and towns in 
lieu of property taxes. Those Massachusetts cities and towns which 
have land owned and used by the Commonwealth for various state 
purposes receive distributions each year from the Commonwealth to 
compensate them to some extent for the real estate taxes which other· 
wise would be collected on account of such land. One of the elements 
in determining the amount of the annual reimbursement is the value 
of the lands used by the state in each city and town. For this purpose, 
the State Tax Commission is required each five years to determine the 
"fair cash value of all land" used for specified purposes.1 The meaning 
of the quoted clause was drawn into question in the case of Board of 
Assessors of Amherst v. State Tax Comm.2 In that case, the commission 
had found the value of the land in Amherst used by the University of 
Massachusetts on January I, 1967, to be approximately $800,000. The 
Board of Assessors had assessed that land at nearly $10 million. The 
Appellate Tax Board, attempting to resolve the dispute between the 
commission and the Board of Assessors, found the fair cash value of 
the land to be approximately $1.3 million. The Board of Assessors ap-
pealed to the Supreme Judicial Court because of allegedly erroneous 
rulings of law by the Appellate Tax Board. 
In substance, the Appellate Tax Board held that the statutory phrase 
"fair cash value" did not have its commonly accepted meaning of the 
highest price which a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller in an 
open market. Rather, the board, relying largely on obscure language in 
a 1910 report to the legislature, ruled that "fair cash value" for pur· 
poses of this statute meant the assessed value of the land. Secondly, the 
board held that "land" for purposes of this statute meant land in its 
unimproved condition, without consideration of improvements made 
to the land (other than buildings). 
The Court reversed the decision of the Appellate Tax Board and 
held, quite correctly, that "fair cash value" in this statute has the 
meaning ordinarily given to it under the real property tax assessment 
statutes and is the equivalent of fair market value. The Court could 
find no clear indication in the cited legislative history that would 
require it to deviate from its statutory duty of defining s1:atutory terms 
in accordance with the common and approved usage of the language 
unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the leg:islature.a The 
decision of the Court on this point was buttressed by its earlier decision 
in Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield,4 which held that all real estate 
§16.4. 1 G.L., c. 58, §13. 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 781, 258 N.E.2d 539. 
3 G.L., c. 4, §6. 
4 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961). 
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in the Commonwealth must be assessed at its full fair cash value. In 
that case, the Court struck down the practice of some assessors of 
applying different percentages of full value to different classes of real 
estate. The State Tax Commission was in effect contending in the 
principal case that the same valuation scheme used by assessors for 
the ordinary real estate tax should be used under the statute in ques-
tion. The commission apparently feared that, if this statute required 
the determination of fair cash value as ordinarily construed, incon-
sistencies would arise in affected towns because other real estate might 
be valued on a different basis. The Bettigole case, however, undercut 
that argument, and the instant decision makes clear that consistent 
valuation practices must be employed. 
The Court followed much the same line of reasoning in construing 
the word land. It found that for purposes of assessment requirements, 
land includes improvements made to it, other than buildings. It could 
perceive nothing to indicate an intent by the legislature that the word 
in this statute should have any different meaning. The Court found 
further support for its conclusion from the apparent legislative purpose 
of compensating municipalities as nearly as possible for the tax 
revenues lost because of the presence of nontaxable state-owned land. 
§16.5. Sales and use taxes. The case of Supreme Council of the 
Royal Arcanum v. State Tax Commn.,1 decided by the Court during 
the 1970 SuRvEY year, raised several' interesting questions relating to 
the sales and use tax. The case arose on a bill for declaratory relief 
brought by Royal Arcanum, a fraternal benefit society under G.L., 
c. 176, seeking a declaration that it was exempt from payment of sales 
or use taxes.2 Royal Arcanum placed reliance upon G.L., c. 176, §49, 
which provides that 
Every society organized or licensed under this chapter is hereby 
declared to be a charity and benevolent institution, and all of its 
funds should be exempt from all and every state, county, district, 
municipal and school tax other than taxes on real estate and office 
equipment. 
The Court held, first, that the Royal Arcanum did not bear the 
incidence of the sales tax on goods purchased by it and, therefore, 
there was no basis for an exemption; and, second, that there was no 
requisite showing of an "actual controversy" within the meaning of 
the declaratory judgment statute, a thus making unnecessary a discussion 
of the merits of Royal Arcanum's claimed exemption from the use tax, 
the incidence of which concededly fell upon the plaintiff. The Court 
went on, however, to discuss the merits and concluded after an 
examination of the pertinent statutes that Royal Arcanum was subject 
§16.5. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1217, 260 N.E.2d 822. 
2 Purchases and rentals by Royal Arcanum of property otherwise subject to tax 
averaged $30,000 over three years. Record at 20. 
<1 G.L., c. 231A, §1. 
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to the use tax since the use tax statute4 did not include fraternal benefit 
societies among the list of persons exempt from the tax. 
The Court's decision did not discuss whether the dedaratory judg-
ment procedure could be used to challenge the sales or use tax. Both 
the sales and the use tax statutes provide an abatement procedure to 
challenge excessive or illegal taxes, and both statutes state that the 
abatement procedure shall be the exclusive remedy available with 
respect to the tax.li In First Agricultural Natl. Bank of Berkshire 
County v. State Tax Commn.,6 the commission demurred to a bill for 
declaratory relief with respect to the imposition of the sales tax on the 
ground that the sales tax statute provided the exclusive remedy by 
which the question of sales tax ·liability may be raised. The Court 
overruled the demurrer, not on the ground that the statute was not 
exclusive, but on the ground that what was being questioned was an 
administrative regulation promulgated under the statute. That case 
left open the question of whether, absent an applicable regulation, 
declaratory relief could be obtained as to a sales or use tax liability. 
If the provision that the abatement procedure is the exclusive remedy 
is to have any meaning, the Court should not allow it to be subverted 
by the use of the declaratory judgment statute. Except in extraordinary 
cases, the Court enforces the "exclusive and adequate remedy" under 
the property tax abatement provisions.7 Thus, the Court could have 
refused to deal with the merits of the case and held that declaratory 
relief was not available to question the sales and use tax statutes. It 
should be noted that the commission expressly agreed that the declar-
atory judgment procedure was a proper means of resolving the con-
troversy.s 
In First Agricultural, the Court held that the incidence of the sales 
tax was upon the vendor, and not the purchaser. The United States 
Supreme Court held, in reviewing this case in First Agr{cultural Natl. 
Bank of Berkshire County v. State Tax Commn.,9 that, insofar as the 
question of the legal incidence of the tax affect~d the immunity of a 
federal instrumentality, the legal incidence of the .tax was upon the 
purchaser under the Massachusetts statute. Of course, in the instant 
case, there was no question of federal immunity. The Supreme Judicial 
Court decided that, in cases not involving a federal instlumentality, it 
would construe the sales tax incidence as falling upon the vendor and 
not the purchaser. There thus results the rather interesting situation of 
the United States Supreme Court saying the incidence of the tax is on 
the purchaser and the Supreme Judicial Court saying the incidence is 
4 G.L., c. 641. 
5 See G.L., cc. 64H and 641, respectively. 
6353 Mass. 172, 229 N.E.2d 245. 
7 See, e.g., Nearis v. Gloucester, 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 447, 257 N.E.2d 4{)7. 
s Record at 10; paragraph 10 of the commission's answer. 
9 393 u.s. !139 (1968). 
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on the vendor. Neither Court apparently feels constrained to follow 
the other. 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court is far more com-
pelling on the question of who bears the legal incidence of the tax. A 
reading of the sales tax statutes directs one to the conclusion that the 
sales tax not only may be passed on to the purchaser (as the Supreme 
Judicial Court suggests) but shall be passed on to the purchaser (as the 
United States Supreme Court says). Certainly, as a practical matter, the 
tax is passed on to the purchaser. The erroneous interpretation of the 
statute made by the Supreme Judicial Court in the First Agricultural 
case has not only been repeated but compounded by the present case. 
It is hoped that, when the issue is next presented, the Supreme Judicial 
Court will reverse itself and bring its decision into conformity with 
that of the United States Supreme Court. 
· With respect to the merits of the exemption claimed by Royal 
Arcanum, one is struck by two inconsistent statutes. The statute quoted 
above relating to fraternal benefit societies exempts such societies from 
"all and every" state and municipal tax except taxes on real estate and 
office equipment.1° On the other hand, the sales and use tax statutes 
provide exemptions of their own, ·but none of the exemptions relates 
to sales to fraternal benefit societies.11 In resolving this inconsistency, 
the Court held that by expressly exempting sales to certain types of 
nonprofit organizations in the sales and use tax statutes, the legislature 
intended to impose the tax on sales to those organizations not enumer-
ated. By this reasoning, the Court concluded that the use tax did apply 
to Royal Arcanum. It can be strongly argued that a contrary result 
should be reached in resolving this inconsistency. The express pro-
vision in Chapter 176, Section 49, exempting fraternal benefit societies 
from all taxes other than those two property taxes enumerated, could 
hardly be made more express. It is a general exemption applied without 
regard to the authority attempting to impose the tax and without 
regard to the nature of the tax. Its general and inclusive language 
indicates that it was intended to cover taxes already in existence as 
well as taxes which may be enacted in the future. On the other hand, 
the exemptions specified under the sales and use tax statutes are specific 
and detailed, encompassing 23 subsections and filling just over four 
pages of text in Massachusetts General Laws Annotated. In view of the 
nature of the legislative process, it is far from inconceivable that sales 
to certain purchasers, such as fraternal benefit societies, were either 
omitted by mistake or were never even considered when the exemp-
tions were drafted. The legislature, in enacting the statute relating to 
fraternal benefit societies, spoke as clearly as it could with respect to tax 
exemptions for such societies. The Court should not have cast aside 
1o G.L., c. 176, §49. 
11 See G.L., cc. 64H and 641, respectively. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/19
450 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.6 
that exemption language except fo:r . subsequent statutory language 
clearly evidencing a legislative intent to amend or repeal by implica-
tion the earlier provision. Such a showing of clear legislative intent is 
markedly absent from the language of the exemptions in the sales and 
use tax statutes. It is significant that Royal Arcanum had been granted 
an exemption from the New York State sales and use. tax on the basis 
of statutory language identical to the exemption statute relied on by 
Royal Arcanum.12 
In conclusion, the Court should have held: (1) the decl.aratory judg-
ment procedure. did not lie to question the sales and use taxes in this 
case; (2) on the merits, the incidence of the sales tax was on the pur-
chaser, not the vendor; and (3) Chapter 176 fraternal benefit societies 
are exempt from payment of sales and use taxes. 
§16.6. Corporate excise tax: Exclusively interstate activity. In 
State Tax Commn. v. Walter E. Heller Co.,1 the Court was again faced 
with the question of how much activity a foreign corporation may en-
gage in within the Commonwealth. while preserving its Jereedom from 
the corporate franchise tax2 because it is engaged exclusilvely in inter-
state commerce. An excise tax on the privilege of· doing business in a 
state may not be applied, consistently with the commerce clause, to a 
corporation engaged solely in interstate commerce, notwithstanding the 
fact that there is some activity in the taxing state incidental to the 
interstate activity.3 Where a corporation does both an iinterstate and 
an intrastate business, a state may levy. an excise tax on the intrastate 
business, the tax being measured by the amount of both interstate and 
intrastate business, reasonably apportioned. This rule was followed in 
M. A. Delph Brokerage Co. of New England v. State Ta" Commn.,4 in 
which the Court held that the activity shown there was only incidental 
to its interstate business and not sufficient in quantity or quality to sub-
ject it to the Massachusetts tax. In Heller, the same issue arose, this time 
in the context of a foreign commercial financing concern engaged in 
lending money from out-of-state offices to Massachuse~tts customers 
through factoring, secured commercial loans, and purchasing install-
ment obligations. The taxpayer did have some activity in Massachusetts 
relating to supervising its Massachusetts accounts. The activity is 
detailed at some length in the record and briefs of the parties. It will 
suffice for present purposes to note that the Massachusetts activity in 
Heller was less in both quantity and quality than permitted in Delph. 
Given the Delph case, the decision in the principal case was hardly 
surprising. In a short rescript opinion, the Court affirmed the decision 
of the Appellate Tax Board which had granted abatements of the tax. 
12 Record at 8. 
§16.6. 1 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1278, 252 N.E.2d 355. 
2 G.L., c. 63, §39. 
a Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925). 
4 347 Mass. 64, 196 N.E.2d 628 (1964). 
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§16.7. Proportional taxation. In Thompson v. Chelsea,! seven-
teen Boston taxpayers sought equitable relief under the "ten taxpayers 
statute"2 as well as declaratory relief with respect to the validity of a 
1909 statute3 which provides in essence that Boston shall pay all the 
taxes for operating Suffolk County and that Chelsea, Winthrop and 
Revere shall not be taxed for county purposes. The bill alleged that the 
statute was in violation of several provisions of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The Supreme Judicial Court, affirming the sustaining of 
demurrers to the bill, held that the "very limited and somewhat 
indefinite allegations of fact ... relied on to show the invalidity of the 
1909 statute"4 did not constitute a sufficient basis for declaratory relief, 
and that the "absence [from the bill] of any clear statement of facts 
showing a threatened immediate expenditure"5 precluded granting 
relief under the "ten taxpayers statute." 
In four and one-half pages of dictum, the Court discussed some of 
the substantive constitutional questions. It reviewed the development 
of Suffolk County beginning in 1821 with the yielding by Chelsea (and 
subsequently by the other two towns) of certain governmental powers 
with respect to the county in return for exemptions from taxes for 
county purposes. After reviewing this history, the Court concluded 
that the "arrangements" embodied in the 1821 and 1831 predecessors 
to the 1909 statute "had many aspects of a legislative contract, sup-
ported by substantial consideration and accepted by the voters of each 
community."6 At this point in the opinion, there is a cryptic footnote 
which cites cases "concerning the inability of persons who have 
voluntarily accepted a contract to assail its constitutionality."7 Whether 
the Court intended by this footnote to suggest an estoppel defense 
based on century-old political "arrangements" is unclear. 
Alternatively, the Court said that it was unable to find that the 1909 
legislation and its predecessors did not rest on a reasonable legislative 
determination or that they established "an arbitrary or capricious allo-
cation of the burden of county costs."8 
No facts alleged are sufficient to present any substantial question 
(a) that the Legislature, in enacting the exemption in the 1909 
statute, did not reasonably take into account all the numerous 
considerations (property, political, governmental, and economic) 
affecting the public interest, or (b) that it then exceeded its 
§16.7. 119'70 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1087, 260 N.E.2d 699. 
2 G.L., c. 40, §53. 
3 Acts of 1909, c. 490, §52. 
4 19'70 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1090, 260 N.E.2d at 701. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Id. at 1093, 260 N.E.2d at 703. 
7 Id. at 1093 n.6, 260 N.E.2d at 703 n.6. 
s Id. at 1094, 260 N.E.2d 704. 
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constitutional powers, or (c) that, by lapse of time and change, 
the statutory arrangements have become unconstitutional.9 
A comprehensive analysis of the constitutional issues involved in the 
case is beyond the scope of this article. For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to observe that the issues are not susceptible o:E satisfactory 
resolution without a considerably more thorough examination than 
was given by the Supreme Judicial Court. For example, the Court 
cites only two United States Supreme Court cases, one of which deals 
with the equality in population of voting districts for local election 
purposes;lo the other is a 1946 case relating to a constitutional chal-
lenge to alleged discriminatory property tax assessment practices in 
which no decision on the federal constitutional issue was reached.H 
Citation of these two cases hardly suggests that the Court made an in-
depth analysis of the questions under the Fourteenth Amendment. It 
is unfortunate that the Court chose to deal so superficially with the 
real and difficult issues raised by the present case. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§16.8. Tort immunity. The collector of taxes of a city or town 
which has taken land under G.L., c. 60, §53, because of real estate tax 
delinquencies may, while in possession thereof and prior teo redemption, 
collect rent and other income from the land and, after paying expenses 
of caring for and managing the land, apply the net proceeds to reduce 
the outstanding taxes. The city or town shall not be liable to the owner 
for failure to collect rent or other income or to any person for injuries 
or damages caused by possession of the land.1 The latter provision 
granting tort immunity to the city or town changes the rule set forth in 
Kurtigian v. Worcester2 in which the city of Worcester was held liable 
in tort for personal injury caused by a private nuisance on land taken 
by the city for tax delinquencies. 
§16.9. Assessment of true value: Requisite information. Assessors 
may require owners or lessees of. real estate to make, under oath, writ-
ten returns containing information needed to assess the true value of 
the property. They may also require testimony under oath relative to 
such returns or abatement applications.! 
§16.10. Charitable corporations and trusts. As a condition to be-
ing exempt from taxes on real and personal property, both charitable 
corporations and charitable trusts, as defined, must deliver to the asses-
sors the list and statement required by G.L., c. 59, §29, and a certificate 
9 Ibid. 
10 Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
11 Hillsborough Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946). 
§16.8. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 85, adding two new paragraphs to G.L., c. 60, §53. 
2 348 Mass. 284, 203 N.E.2d 692 (1965). 
§16.9. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 118, adding new §§38B and 38C to G.L.,. c. 59. 
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under oath that the organization's annual report has been filed with the 
Division of Public Charities of the Attorney General's Office.1 
§16.ll. Inheritance tax: Statute of limitations. In 1969 a new 
statute of limitations for the assessment of inheritance taxes was 
enacted.l That statute has been amended to provide that if, at the 
expiration of the statutory period, any question relating to the in-
heritance tax is pending before any agency or court, the statutory 
assessment and collection period shall be extended until one year after 
the final determination of that question.2 
§16.12. Inheritance tax: Family residence exemption re-enacted. 
A 1969 statutei deleted the exemption from the inheritance tax of a 
family residence passing to a surviving spouse as the surviving joint 
tenant or tenant by the entirety.2 The exemption has been re-enacted 
by a statute "making corrective changes in certain tax laws," and the 
re-enactment has been made retroactive.to January 1, 1970, when the 
1969 statute became effective.3 
§16.13. Excessive or illegal tax: Abatement. The statute authoriz-
ing the State Tax Commission to grant abatements in its discretion 
for taxesillegally assessed or levied or found to be excessive or unwar-
ranted has been repealed.1 Taxpayers now must follow the regular 
abatement procedure to recover such taxes. 
§ 16.10. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 219, amending G.L., c. 59, §5, cl. Third, (b). 
§16.11. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 561, appearing as G.L., c. 65, §33A. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 565, amending G.L., c. 65, §33A. 
§16.12. 1 Acts of 1969, c. 600, §2. 
2 G.L., c. 65, §I. 
a Acts of 1970, c. 566, §§8, 9. 
~16.13. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 601, §1, repealing G.L., c. 58, §27. 
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